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I. INTRODUCrION
In Reed v. Commissioner' the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dealt with
the ability of a taxpayer to defer2 imposition of federal income tax. The court
sanctioned the use of an escrow 3 mechanism to defer the realization of gain upon the
sale of stock in a closely-held corporation. The rule generally applied by courts and
the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") is that when a buyer irrevocably places sale
proceeds in an escrow account to be paid to the seller-taxpayer 4 at a later time, and
no condition other than the passage of time prevents the seller-taxpayer from receiving
the funds, the seller-taxpayer is treated as realizing income as of the time when the
funds were given to the escrowee5 for deposit in the escrow account. 6
Seller-taxpayers have avoided the realization of gain in the year of sale by use
of the installment method of tax accounting. 7 The installment method permits a
seller-taxpayer to recognize only a portion of the gain in each year a payment is
made. 8 However, if Reed is followed in other jurisdictions, the escrow arrangement
may be used to achieve the same deferral as is obtained using the installment method,
with the advantage of securing the sale by placing the proceeds beyond the reach of
the buyer.9
1. 723 F.2d 138 (Ist Cir. 1983).
2. Deferral is usually a tax benefit because the tax on a particular transaction is postponed until the taxpayer files
a tax return in a succeeding year. Because of the time value of money, for larger transactions this deferral can result in
significant tax savings. However, in Reed the deferral amounted to only one week which may have been one unstated
reason for the court's ruling in favor of the seller-taxpayer.
3. An escrow is defined as:
any written instrument which by its terms imposes a legal obligation, and which is deposited by the grantor,
promisor or obligor, or his agent, with a stranger or third party, to be kept by the depository until the performance
of a condition or the happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee or
obligee.
Johnson v. Wallden, 342 111. 201, 206, 173 N.E. 790, 792 (1930).
4. It is important for the reader to distinguish between the parties. In this Comment the taxpayer is the property
seller and is usually receiving some form of cash. In Reed, for example, the taxpayer was selling stock and receiving cash
from the escrowee.
5. An escrowee is the intermediary between the promisor and the promisee. J. CRiBBr, PRscmNaPs or THE LAw or
PRorPsa 166 (1962). The escrowee occupies a fiduciary position with respect to the property placed in escrow. Id. at n.39.
6. Reed v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1982), rev'd, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
7. I.R.C. § 453 (1982). For a discussion of the fundamentals of the installment method, see infra text
accompanying notes 148-60. A major problem with forcing the seller-taxpayer to realize a gain in a single year is the
possibility that the gain is very large as compared to the actual cash received. Often the seller-taxpayer must pay a huge
tax on highly mortgaged property. As a result the cash proceeds actually received are far less than the tax due.
8. Id.
9. Of course, once the proceeds are no longer under the control of the buyer, the seller-taxpayer need not rely on
the buyer's creditworthiness. Since financing is a major obstacle in most commercial transactions, an arrangement that
permits the seller-taxpayer to secure the sale by irrevocably placing the proceeds beyond the buyer's control is of great
value.
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The underlying issue in analyzing escrow arrangements such as the one in Reed
is how secure the seller-taxpayer can make the transaction before the seller-taxpayer
has enough ownership attributes to justify imposition of federal income tax. Professor
Bittker has said, "[in short, there is an inverse relationship between financial security
and tax security: Taxpayers who want one must give up the other." 10
II. THE CASE OF Reed v. Commissioner
A. Facts
The taxpayer, John E. Reed, owned approximately 20 percent of Electromech,
a closely held corporation." Reed and several other shareholders entered into an
agreement giving Joseph Cvengros an option to buy their Electromech stock.
Cvengros exercised his purchase option on November 23, 1973.12 The closing was
scheduled for December 27, 1973.13
The sellers, and the taxpayer in particular, became concerned about the poten-
tially adverse tax consequences of the sale and tried to postpone the closing until
1974.14 Reed was interested in a postponement because he wanted to offset the capital
gain from the sale of Electromech stock with the sale of other investments that would
generate capital losses.' 5 Since the sale of the Electromech stock was to take place at
the end of 1973, Reed was concerned that he would not have enough time to organize
the sale of his other investments to offset the capital gain from the sale of Electromech
stock. 16 Reed also was concerned that Cvengros's financing would fail, making it
impossible for Reed to offset his capital losses with the sale of Electromech stock. 17
At first, the buyers insisted on a 1973 sale. 8 Eventually, the parties agreed orally to
modify the original sale agreement and to defer the proceeds.19 The oral modification
was eventually memorialized in a written escrow agreement. 20
At the closing, Cvengros endorsed and delivered a check to the American
National Bank and Trust Company as escrowee. 2' Simultaneously, the taxpayer and
the other selling shareholders delivered the stock to Cvengros. The escrow agreement
provided that the sellers were not to receive any investment income or any other
10. 4 B. BrnxE FEDERAL TAXATIO OF INCOME, EStATES AND GiFTs, 105-30 (1981).
11. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 1983).
12. Id. at 141.
13. Id. at 140.
14. Id. at 141.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Neither the Tax Court nor the Court of Appeals was concerned about the oral modification to the original sale
agreement. The Court of Appeals said, "[W]e are unable to say that the deferred payment agreement was any less bona
fide or any less a part of the purchase-sale agreement merely because it was not memorialized until just prior to closing."
Id. at 144. The Tax Court said, "an existing agreement which has been modified to provide for deferred payment of
amounts not yet due generally will also be effective to postpone recognition of income." Reed v. Commissioner, 45
T.C.M. (CCH) 398, 400 (1982), rev'd, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
20. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 140 n.1 (1st Cir. 1983).
21. Id. at 141. Cvengros obtained outside financing for the amount of $808,500.
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incidental financial benefits. 22 The agreement also provided that the escrowee was to
distribute the proceeds to the seller-taxpayer on January 3, 1974.23 Thus, only a week
had to pass before the sellers could receive the escrowed sale proceeds.
In a memorandum decision, the Tax Court held summarily that Reed realized
gain from the sale when Cvengros deposited the proceeds in the escrow account. 24
Relying mainly on prior Tax Court decisions, 25 the court said:
[W]hen, upon receipt of the goods, the buyer deposits the full purchase price in an escrow
account to be paid to the seller at a later date and no condition other than the passage of
time is placed on the seller's right to receive the escrow funds, courts have held that the
seller recognizes income when the buyer deposits the funds with the escrowee.26
The taxpayer appealed, and the First Circuit reversed the Tax Court. 27
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that John Reed did not have to
recognize income in 1973, the year of sale. 28 The court was concerned only with what
the taxpayer received in the transaction. The court concluded that an escrow device
could effectively postpone the realization of gain on a deferred payment sale provided
that three conditions were met:
(1)the escrow arrangement is part of a bona fide, arms-length agreement between the
purchaser and seller calling for deferred payment;
(2)the seller receives no present beneficial interest (i.e., investment income) from the
purchase funds while they are in escrow; and
(3)the escrowee is not acting under the exclusive authority of the taxpayer.29
In holding for the taxpayer, the court concluded that these conditions were
satisfied.
The Service advanced three main arguments.30 First, it argued that the taxpayer
had constructively received the sale proceeds in the prior tax year because the escrow
device was self-imposed. Second, the Service contended that the taxpayer had
received an economic benefit because the right to receive the proceeds was irrevo-
cably vested at the time the funds were placed in escrow. Finally, the Service argued
that even if the escrow was found not to be self-imposed, the escrowee was the
taxpayer's agent. The Service then reasoned that receipt by the taxpayer's agent
constitutes receipt by the taxpayer. The Service's conclusion under each of the three
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Reed v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 398 (1982), rev'd, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
25. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955); Stiles v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 558, 563
(1978); Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569, 577 (1971); Pozzi v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 119 (1967); Kuehner v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 875 (1953), affd, 214 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1954).
26. Reed v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 398, 400 (1982), rev'd, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
27. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (Ist Cir. 1983).
28. Id. at 149.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 142.
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arguments was that the taxpayer realized the gain from the sale of Electromech stock
in 1973 when the funds were placed in the escrow account.
The court responded to these arguments consecutively. It summarized the con-
structive receipt doctrine as "an unqualified, vested right to receive immediate
payment. ' 3 1 The doctrine is not part of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), but it
has been part of the Treasury Regulations since 1919.32 Under the regulations,
constructive receipt is income that has been made available to the taxpayer but has not
actually been reduced to the taxpayer's possession. 33 The regulations add that there
is no constructive receipt when the taxpayer's control "is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions. ,34
The constructive receipt doctrine is generally applied when a cash basis taxpayer
refuses payment in favor of an escrow device after payment already has been
tendered. 35 In Reed the Service argued that full payment was tendered when Cvengros
placed the funds in the escrow account. 36 The court found, however, that the
constructive receipt doctrine is applicable only when the taxpayer creates a self-
imposed limitation, 37 and held that the escrow account in Reed was not self-
imposed.38 Moreover, the court stated that an escrow account with time as the only
restriction could be considered a substantial limitation on the taxpayer's control of the
escrowed funds. 39
After finding that the constructive receipt doctrine was inapplicable, the court
turned to an analysis of the economic benefit doctrine.40 The Service argued that Reed
received an economic benefit when the buyer deposited the proceeds in escrow
because the seller-taxpayer received a cash equivalent. 41 The Service argued further
that the cash equivalent is demonstrated by the taxpayer's ability to assign the right
to receive future payment.42
31. Id.
32. T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 189 (1919).
33. The full text of Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1958) provides as follows:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is constructively received by him in the taxable
year during which it is credited to his account or set apart for him so that he may draw upon it at any time.
However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions.
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1958).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955). The taxpayer entered into a contract for
the sale of his timber. Instead of accepting immediate payment the taxpayer arranged an escrow account to attempt to defer
the realization of the gain on the timber sale. The Fifth Circuit held for the Service because it was persuaded that the
taxpayer had control over the sale proceeds because the escrow arrangement was self-imposed. Id. at 527.
36. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 142 (1st Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 143.
38. Id. "Self-imposed" in this context means that the seller-taxpayer controls the escrow arrangement either
directly or through the use of the escrowee in an agency capacity.
39. The court cited Commissioner v. Tyler, 72 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1934), for the proposition that time could be a
substantial limitation when there is a bona fide sale agreement between the buyer and seller. Reed v. Commissioner, 723
F.2d 138, 142-43 (1st Cir. 1983).
40. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 145 (Ist Cir. 1983).
41. Id. Property received is a cash equivalent when it may be readily converted into cash. Thus, a promise to pay
is the equivalent of cash when it is marketable. See infra text accompanying notes 81-125.
42. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 145 (1st Cir. 1983).
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In making the economic benefit argument, the Service relied on the court's 1954
decision in Kuehner v. Commissioner.43 In Kuehner, the taxpayer sold her 50 shares
of stock in Alkay Jewelry Co. for $65,000. 44 The proceeds were to be paid to the
taxpayer in equal installments of $13,000 over a consecutive five-year period. 45 The
escrowee agreed to release 10 shares of stock to the buyer and $13,000 cash to the
seller during the five-year period.46 At the end of the five-year period the seller-
taxpayer was to receive the accumulated interest income from the entire sale
proceeds. 47 In addition, full voting rights were transferred to the buyer as the shares
of stock were transferred. 48 Thus, the Service argued that the seller-taxpayer had
received a present interest with an ascertainable value that was subject to federal
income taxation. 49 In Kuehner the Tax Court agreed with the Service, holding that as
only formal acts by the trustee prevented the taxpayer from receiving the sale
proceeds, the sale was complete when the buyer placed the proceeds in escrow.50
The Reed court rejected the application of Kuehner for three reasons. First, the
taxpayer in Reed did not receive a present beneficial interest. The court said that in
Kuehner the taxpayer received interest income which made it distinguishable from
Reed.5' Second, the court said that to apply Kuehner as the Service urged "would be
at odds with the well established principle that a deferred payment arrangement is
effective to defer income recognition to a cash basis taxpayer provided it is part of an
arms-length agreement .... ",52 Last, the court said that application of the economic
benefit doctrine to Reed "would significantly erode the distinction between cash and
accrual methods of accounting." '53
43. 214 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1954).
44. Id. at 438.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 439.
50. Kuchner v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 875, 884 (1953), affd, 214 F.2d 437 (lst Cir. 1954).
51. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 146 (1st Cir. 1983). Receipt of interest income is a strong indication
that the seller-taxpayer received an economic benefit because he or she is in the same economic position as if cash had
been received directly and deposited in a bank account. In Kuehner the parties assumed the benefits and burdens of
ownership and the essence of the escrow arrangement was no different than an outright sale. The Reed court held that
Kuehner was distinguishable mainly because the seller-taxpayer in Reed did not receive a present beneficial interest such
as investment income.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 147. Traditionally, a distinction has been made between "cash basis" taxpayers, who realize income and
expenses only upon actual receipt or payment of cash, and "accrual basis" taxpayers, who realize income as it is earned
and expenses as they are incurred. I.R.C. § 446(c) (1982). Goldberg, Open Transaction Treatment for Deferred Payment
Sales After the Installment Sales Act of 1980, 34 TAx LAwYER 605, 630 n.84 (1981). Apparently, the rationale for the
distinction is overall fairness to the taxpayer. A system that permits the realization of income only upon actual receipt
enables a taxpayer to pay the tax due using the cash proceeds that were received. If a cash basis taxpayer is forced to realize
income when it is earned, at the point when the proceeds are placed in escrow, then the taxpayer may find that there are
insufficient funds to pay the tax. Id. at 627 n.78.
Another explanation for the use of the cash method of tax accounting is that the cash method is easily applied and
administered. Id. at 627. Use of the cash method minimizes or eliminates the need to allocate receipts and expenses and
thus reduces bookkeeping costs. Moreover, from the standpoint of compliance with the Code, actual receipt provides an
easy benchmark for identification of a taxable event and permits the Service to more easily verify income received by the
taxpayer.
19851 1005
1006 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1001
When the economic benefit doctrine is applied to a cash basis taxpayer, the court
noted, "courts generally go beyond an inquiry into the fair market value of the
contract right to ask the separate question of whether the contractual right is the
equivalent of cash.' "4 A cash equivalent is defined as the ability to "readily convert
the promissory obligation into cash in established markets.' 5 The court viewed the
escrow account as a mere security device rather than as present payment.5 6 Therefore,
the court found that the seller-taxpayer had received no cash equivalent.
Finally, the Reed court rejected the Service's argument that the escrowee was
Reed's agent.5 7 In so doing, the court followed the same line of reasoning as it did
in its rejection of the constructive receipt doctrine,5 8 stating that the underlying attack
is the same in both situations. 59 To impose federal income tax under either the
constructive receipt doctrine or agency theory, the deferral must have been unilater-
ally imposed and not part of a bona fide agreement. The court was persuaded by the
active participation of both parties in the escrow arrangement, and thus found that the
escrow was not unilaterally imposed.6° Moreover, the buyer initially refused to
modify the timing of the sale.
HI. ANALYSIS OF Reed v. Commissioner
A. The Constructive Receipt and Economic Benefit Doctrines Compared
The limitation that the constructive receipt doctrine places on the ability of a cash
basis taxpayer to structure a transaction has been explained by the United States
Supreme Court thus: "The income that is subject to [taxpayers'] unfettered command
and that [they are] free to enjoy at [their] own option may be taxed to [them] as [their]
income, whether [they] see fit to enjoy it or not.' '61 Other courts have interpreted the
doctrine to mean that taxpayers may not "deliberately turn [their] back[s]" on income
and report it in the year of their choosing. 62
The economic benefit doctrine dictates that a tax be imposed on any benefit
conferred so long as the benefit has an ascertainable fair market value. 63 In other
words, something of value must be transferred and actually received before the
54. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 147 (1st Cir. 1983).
55. Goldberg, supra note 53, at 629. For a discussion of cash equivalency, see infra text accompanying notes
81-125.
56. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 148 (Ist Cir. 1983) ("the escrow account was not intended by the parties
as present payment of the purchase price, but rather was intended to serve as an added assurance that payment would be
made in the next year.").
57. Id. at 149. This argument logically follows and is based on the agency principle that "receipt of the proceeds
by the seller's agent is tantamount to receipt by the principal." Id. at 148. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 342, 347 (1920). Courts have held the taxpayer-principal liable for federal income tax based on this
theory. Hines v. United States, 90 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 756 (1937).
58. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 148 (Ist Cir. 1983).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 141, 149. The success of the agency argument depends on the effectiveness of the constructive receipt
doctrine after the agency relationship is established, therefore, the agency argument is conceptually the same and will not
be treated separately in this Comment.
61. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930). See text accompanying notes 28-36.
62. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 63, 67 (1933).
63. See generally MnTroNS, 2 LAw oF FEnazA. INCOME TAXASON, § 10.01 (1982).
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economic benefit doctrine is triggered. However, this does not mean that the property
must actually be received. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted, the
economic benefit doctrine is generally applied only when the taxpayer has received
a cash equivalent, because upon receipt of a cash equivalent the taxpayer has received
something ascertainable. 64
The traditional distinction made between the constructive receipt doctrine and
the economic benefit doctrine is that "constructive receipt deals with 'when' property
should be included in a taxpayer's gross income,. . . while economic benefit deals
with 'what' property or rights actually received by a taxpayer should be subject to
immediate taxation." 65 Thus, the constructive receipt doctrine is primarily concerned
with timing, while the economic benefit doctrine, although concerned with timing,
deals with broader questions of ownership. The thrust of the distinction is that for
proper application of the economic benefit doctrine the taxpayer must actually receive
something that has an ascertainable value, whereas the constructive receipt doctrine
is better applied to situations in which the taxpayer has power over immediate
payment of the proceeds. 66
As the court acknowledged in Reed, the constructive receipt and economic
benefit doctrines overlap, 67 and, as a result, any distinction is somewhat artificial.
Ultimately, imposition of either doctrine has the same net effect: the entire gain is
taxed in the year the transaction occurs. This is true because if the Service is
successful, realization is deemed to occur at the point when the property is irrevocably
placed into the escrow account. 68 Consequently, the thrust of the argument is on the
timing of the imposition of the federal income tax. 69 The seller-taxpayer may be faced
with a much larger gain than anticipated merely because he or she was forced to
include the entire proceeds in gross income for the year of sale. Furthermore,
installment treatment may be denied and therefore the federal income tax will be
substantially larger because the entire gain is taxed in the year of sale. 70
As traditionally applied, the constructive receipt doctrine was properly rejected
by the Court of Appeals. General constructive receipt theory should not be applied to
cases in which bona fide escrow agreements prohibit the seller-taxpayer from
64. The imposition of federal income tax upon the receipt of a cash equivalent may be found in the regulations
dating back to 1919. T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 189 (1919). However, the formal genesis of the economic
benefit doctrine is found in Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945). Note, Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d
810 (Ct. CI. 1978), 33 TAx LAwEr 308, 311 (1979); See also Metzer, Constructive Receipt, Economic Benefit and
Assignment of Income: A Case Study in Deferred Compensation, 29 TAx L. Rav., 525, 550-51 (1974). Today, the
economic benefit doctrine is incorporated in the regulations to Code section 446. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(3) (1958).
Section 446 of the Code sets forth the general methods of tax accounting.
65. Metzer, supra note 64.
66. The two doctrines are merely different ways of answering the same question: Who owns the property?
67. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 142 (1st Cir. 1983).
68. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 180, modified, Rev. Rul. 64-279, 1964-2 C.B. 121, modifiedfurther,
Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100. In this ruling the Service cited Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff d
per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952), for the proposition that the point of realization is the time at which the amount
received by the taxpayer is irrevocably paid out for the taxpayer's benefit. See also Private Letter Ruling 8113107 154,952
(P.H.) (1980) (citing Sproull for the same proposition.).
69. The timing of the tax is critical because acceleration of the taxable event to the year of sale can have devastating
effects on the cash flow of the seller-taxpayer.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 160-64.
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reducing the property to physical possession. 71 The taxpayer is unable to exercise
control over the funds unless the escrow is a subterfuge and the escrowee is the
taxpayer's agent.72
The Service argued that Williams v. United States73 applied because the escrow
was self-imposed by the taxpayer. 74 In Williams the taxpayer entered into a contract
for the sale of his timber. The taxpayer declined to accept immediate payment, instead
arranging an escrow account in an attempt to defer the realization of the gain on the
sale. 75 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held for the Service because it was
persuaded that the taxpayer had control over the sale proceeds. The buyer was ready,
willing, and able to deliver the purchase price. 76 This is a classic application of the
constructive receipt doctrine.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit correctly rejected the application to
Reed of the reasoning in Williams.77 In Williams the sale had taken place and the
taxpayer was in constructive receipt before the escrow account was established. 78 The
correct focus of the constructive receipt doctrine is when the escrow was imposed,
rather than the nature of its imposition. 79 In Williams, unlike Reed, the escrow was
imposed after the taxpayer was in constructive receipt.80 Consequently, the taxpayer
in Williams did constructively receive the escrow proceeds, but the taxpayer in Reed
did not. Although the distinction between the economic benefit and constructive
receipt doctrines is somewhat artificial, the economic benefit doctrine is more
applicable to the facts of Reed.
B. When Has a Seller Received an Economic Benefit?
The formal basis of the economic benefit doctrine may be found in the evolution
of the cash equivalent doctrine. 81 The First Circuit properly applied the cash
71. Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 817-20 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
72. If the seller-taxpayer is able to direct the investment of the escrow proceeds, and if the gross amount is payable
to the seller-taxpayer as in Kuehner v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 437, 438 (Ist Cir. 1954), it would be more difficult to
dispute application of the constructive receipt doctrine. The seller-taxpayer will have done everything consistent with
ownership, and the artificial delay imposed by the escrow account should be insufficient to defer the imposition of federal
income tax, even though a technical reading of regulation § 1.451-2(a) would indicate that the proceeds would not be
constructively received. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. Under the circumstances described above both the
economic benefit and constructive receipt doctrines should be applicable.
73. 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
75. Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523, 524 n.2 (5th Cir. 1955).
76. Id.
77. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 144 (1st Cir. 1983).
78. Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1955); see also Falk, Constructive Receipt and
Economic Benefit: Putting Reed in the Proper Perspective, 62 TAXEs 425 (1984):
IThe court rightfully distinguished the Williams decision from the facts in Reed, because the taxpayer was in
constructive receipt at the time of the attempted deferral in Williams, while Reed was never in constructive
receipt at the time of the contract modification. This is a crucial distinction since receipt-actual or construc-
tive-is the point of taxation for a cash basis taxpayer, and, after the right to receive ripens to receipt, no
arrangement can alter the taxability.
Id. at 428.
79. Falk, supra note 78.
80. Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523, 524 n.2 (5th Cir. 1955).
81. See supra note 64.
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equivalent doctrine to the escrow arrangement in Reed.82 Property received that does
not consist of cash is nevertheless the equivalent of cash when it may be readily
converted into cash.
It seems that it is impossible to say exactly what interests constitute an economic
benefit, especially when the taxpayer has received noncash property.8 3 But it is
manifestly true that at some point a noncash benefit becomes so ascertainable and
fixed in time and amount and so much like cash that the economic benefit doctrine
must be invoked to preserve the integrity of the tax system. If this were not true,
taxation could be avoided by simply providing for payment with a cash equivalent.
However, the underlying question is at what point the property received is so
equivalent to cash as to justify treating the property as part of the amount realized
under section 1001 of the Code. 84
1. Classification of a Promise to Pay as a Cash Equivalent
At common law, three general rules have been identified by the courts when
construing a payment that is potentially the equivalent of cash. 85 First, the receipt of
a mere promise to make a deferred payment will not result in immediate realization
of income if the promise is not evidenced by a note or otherwise secured by an
indebtedness that might be readily marketable. 86 Second, the receipt of a promise,
whether or not secured by a note or otherwise, will not result in immediate realization
of income if the promise is intended by the parties as mere evidence of payment rather
than payment itself.8 7 Finally, an unconditional promise to make a deferred payment,
evidenced by a note or secured otherwise, will trigger federal income tax if the
promise is intended as payment and if it has an ascertainable fair market value. 88
In situations involving escrow accounts, the Tax Court's position has been
articulated on several occasions in the installment sale area, 89 and its position
generally supports the rules set out above.9° The Tax Court has held that when the
funds set aside in the escrow account are intended merely to secure payment, a cash
basis taxpayer does not realize income until actual receipt of the proceeds. 9' How-
ever, if the seller receives payment directly from the escrow account, the constructive
82. See infra text accompanying notes 106-12.
83. The property Reed received was the escrow agreement which served as evidence of the indebtedness owed by
the buyer. In Reed receipt of the proceeds in the escrow account was inevitable. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138,
141 (Ist Cir. 1983).
84. From a technical standpoint, finding a cash equivalent is important because that is part of the amount realized.
I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1982). The amount realized is the starting point in computing the taxpayer's gain on the property
disposition. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1982). Once it is concluded that something of value has been transferred and that it is the
equivalent of cash, it must be included in the amount realized to the extent of its fair market value. I.R.C. § 1001(b)
(1982).
85. Metzer, supra note 64, at 553-55.
86. Id. at 553-54.
87. Id. at 554.
88. Id. at 554-55.
89. See infra, notes 148-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the installment method of reporting.
90. See infra notes 91-93.
91. See, e.g., Porterfield v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 91, 95 (1979).
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receipt doctrine 92 and the economic benefit doctrine93 are invoked to trigger realiza-
tion of income relating back to the time the buyer placed the funds in escrow.
Apparently, the Tax Court reasons that, if the funds are set aside as payment of an
underlying debt, then the escrow account represents more than a mere promise to
pay. 94 Instead, it represents an economic benefit that has an ascertainable market
value.
Historically, the Service's position on the effectiveness of an escrow device to
defer realization of income has been unclear for several reasons. First, the Service's
position is unclear because it has changed its viewpoint. In Revenue Ruling 68-246,
the Service took the position that time alone would suffice as a substantial limitation
on the taxpayer's control. 95 The Service thereby sanctioned the use of an escrow
device as a valid mechanism to defer federal income tax. However, in 1977 the
Service revoked Revenue Ruling 68-246, and since then has consistently rejected the
use of an escrow device to defer taxation when the escrow proceeds are used directly
as part of the consideration received by the seller-taxpayer. 96 Second, the Service's
position has remained unclear because it has never fully articulated its reason for
rejecting the escrow device. More specifically, the Service has not limited its attack
to either the constructive receipt or economic benefit doctrine. Rather, it has used a
blanket prohibition where the seller-taxpayer receives any part of the consideration
from the escrow account. 97
In Revenue Ruling 77-294,98 the Service revoked Revenue Ruling 68-246 and
ruled that an escrow does not create a substantial limitation or restriction by an
92. See, e.g., Arnwine v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1983); Warren v. United States, 613 F.2d 591
(5th Cir. 1980); Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955); Kuehner v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 437 (1st
Cir. 1954).
93. See, e.g., Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933 (1980); Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971); Pozzi
v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 119 (1967).
94. Porterfield v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 91, 93 (1979). In construing the intention of the parties, the Tax Court
ignored clear contractual language that permitted the seller-taxpayer to receive the escrow proceeds directly.
95. 1968-1 C.B. 198. In this ruling, the taxpayer received, in the year of sale, 30% as a down payment and an
installment note for the remainder of the selling price. Id. at 199. The parties subsequently established an escrow account
as a receptacle for the remainder of the sale proceeds. Id. The buyer transferred the proceeds to the escrowee in
consideration for cancellation of the lien on the property transferred. Thus, an escrow account was substituted for the
previously arranged installment note. The escrowee released the subsequent installments, but the buyer was personally
liable for any unpaid installment payments. Id.
The Service took the position that the escrow arrangement prevented the taxpayer from receiving the funds and
therefore payment could not be accelerated. Id. In effect, the substitution of the escrow fund after the sale was considered
part of the sale proceeds because nothing had changed: the taxpayer was no closer to the funds than before the escrow
substitution. Id. Consequently, installment treatment was permitted. Id.
In several cases with similar fact patterns, installment treatment has been denied. See, e.g., Williams v. United
States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955); Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933 (1980); Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
569 (1971); Pozzi v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 119 (1967).
96. Rev. Rul. 77-294, 1977-2 C.B. 173, amplified, Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-1 C.B. 179. The seminal ruling on
deferral is 60-31, in which the Service discussed five examples of deferral including a case in which the Service rejected
the use of an escrow device to defer imposition of federal income tax. 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified, Rev. Rul. 64-279,
1964-2 C.B. 121, modifiedfurther, Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100. In addition, regulation § 1.61-2(d)(4) long has
provided that receipt of a note in payment for services is compensation to the extent of its fair market value. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-2(d)(4) (1958). The Service continues to reject the use of an escrow device in the installment sale area. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(5)(ex 8), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 301.
97. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(5)(ex 8), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 301.
98. Rev. Rul. 77-294, 1977-2 C.B. 173, amplified, Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-1 C.B. 179.
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installment seller. 99 Therefore, installment treatment was denied and the seller-
taxpayer was forced to include the entire proceeds in gross income in the year of
sale. 100 Since the Service did not articulate its reasoning it is unclear which doctrine
was applied.
The result is the same under either the Service's or the Tax Court's position: an
escrow account may not be used to defer taxation unless the taxpayer carefully
structures the transaction to appear as mere security. 101 This requires that the escrow
proceeds not be used as part of the consideration paid to the seller-taxpayer.
2. The Cash Equivalent Doctrine as it Applies to Reed v. Commissioner
In examining what the taxpayer in Reed received, the court initially focused on
whether the taxpayer received a present beneficial interest-interest income. Reed
received no obvious present beneficial interest from the escrowee. The court,
however, also asked whether the taxpayer received anything that could constitute a
cash equivalent. 02 Essentially, the court examined the economic reality of the
transaction and asked whether Reed was in a better economic position than if he had
received an unsecured promise. 03 "The proper test should look to the character of the
receipt because the touchstone is whether the taxpayer is in an economic position
essentially equivalent to having received cash .... [S]ubjective intent . . . [is]
irrelevent to this inquiry." 0 4 The analysis of the taxpayer's economic position is not
enhanced by determining the intention of the parties, as the Tax Court and the Service
routinely maintain. Therefore, a cash basis seller should not include the buyer's future
promise of payment in the current taxable year unless the promise is the equivalent
of cash,10 5 regardless of the intent of the parties.
One basis for its refusal to apply Kuehner v. Commissioner'06 was the Court of
Appeal's finding that, when applying the economic benefit doctrine to a cash basis
taxpayer, an inquiry should be made into whether the taxpayer received a cash
equivalent. 07 The court added that "[w]ithout this separate inquiry, the economic
benefit doctrine, as applied to a cash basis taxpayer, could be broadly construed to
cover all deferred compensation and deferred payment contracts." 1 08
99. Id.
100. Rev. Rul. 77-294, 1977-2 C.B. 173, 1974, amplified, Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-1 C.B. 179.
101. For some planning suggestions, see generally Braubach & Wishaar, Securing Installment Sales With Letters of
Credit and Escrow Arrangements, 9 J. REAL Esr. TAx. 203 (1982); Klein, Installment Sale Success Story-Escrow Funds
Are Security, Not Payment in the Year of Sale, 7 J. REAL Est. TAx. 280 (1980); Ledlie, Letters of Credit or Escrow
Accounts Used as Security in Installment Sale Transactions, 60 TAxFs 130 (1982); Maples, Recent decisions make it easier
to use escrow accounts to defer the recognition of income, 33 TAX'N FOR Accr 20 (1984); Parker, Substitution of escrow
will destroy benefits of installment sale says IRS, 47 J. TAx'N. 346 (1977).
102. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 147 (Ist Cir. 1983).
103. See generally MERomxs, supra note 63.
104. Goldberg, supra note 53, at 630 n.84.
105. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663, 667 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975); Estate of
Hurlburt v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1286, 1288-89 (1956); Estate of Ennis v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 799, 802 (1955);
Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465, 469 (1951); Johnston v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560, 566 (1950).
106. 214 F.2d 437 (lst Cir. 1954). For a review of the facts of Kuehner, see supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
107. Reed v. Commissioner, 738 F.2d 138, 147 (1st Cir. 1983).
108. Id.
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Some commentators have criticized the use of the cash equivalent approach in
analyzing whether the taxpayer has received an economic benefit. 109 In Warren Jones
Co. v. Commissioner,t 0 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court and held that the amount realized by the taxpayer must include the fair market
value of property received, if ascertainable.' Essentially, the Warren Jones court
rejected the use of marketability as a measure of realization. Instead, the court's test
stated that if the property received has an ascertainable fair market value it must be
included as a part of the amount realized under section 1001(b) of the Code." 2
Marketability should be distinguished from the concept of ascertainable fair
market value." 3 "[Ilt is absurd to speak of a promise to pay a sum in the future as
having a 'market value,' fair or unfair. Such rights are sold, if at all, only by seeking
out a purchaser and higgling with him [or her] on the basis of the particular
transaction.""14 Of course, if no market for the indebtedness exists, then the
ascertainable fair market value is zero. If that were the case, in effect there would be
no difference between marketability and ascertainable fair market value, and the
result would be the same under either theory.
Whether an asset is "readily marketable," and if so, at what point in time it
becomes marketable, are questions subject to interpretation. In Cowden v. Commis-
sioner"15 the court listed several indicia of a readily marketable asset. " 6 The taxpayer
in that case had leased mineral rights to Stanolind in return for royalty payments
which would become due in January of each year."t 7 The contract amount was an
absolute personal obligation of the oil company.'" 8 Thereafter, the taxpayer assigned
the rights to the future payments to the First National Bank of Midland, of which the
109. Falk, Constructive Receipt and Economic Benefit: Putting Reed In Proper Perspective, 62 T.cs 425, 429
(1984); Haley, The Application of Section 1001 to Deferred Payment Sales of Property, 28 T-x LAWYTR 303 (1975); Levin
& Javaras, Receipt of Notes and Other Rights to Future Payments by a Cash-Basis Taxpayer, 54 A.B.A. J. 405, 406
(1968); Llewellen, Promises To Pay In The Future-A Modest Proposal For Reform, 31 U. Mimu L. REv. 1337, 1340
(1977).
110. 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
111. The court traced the development of § 1001 of the Code and concluded that the "amount realized" from the
sale of "property" no longer depended upon an analysis of marketability and thus no longer depended upon the cash
equivalent theory. Id. at 792-93. The court deduced this from its analysis of the legislative history of§ 1001 and its finding
that the words "readily realizable" were deleted from the definition of "amount realized" in the 1924 amendment to
§ 1001. Id.
However, no other courts have adopted this portion of the Warren Jones analysis, and commentators have questioned
its reasoning. See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 635; Weitzman, Revenue Ruling 69-74: An Administrative Re ersal of
Burnet v. Logan and The Cash Equivalence Doctrine, 31 U. FLA. L. Ray. 216, 232-40 (1978). See also Ginsburg, Taxing
the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAX. L. Rav. 471, 556-57 (1975). A better explanation for the removal of the phrase
"readily realizable" is the concern that the drafters had for the determination of the value of the amount realized rather
than the quite different issue of marketability. Goldberg, supra note 53, at 636.
112. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 147 n.7 (1983).
114. Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929); see also Humphrey v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A.
280 (1935).
115. 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
116. Id. at 24.
117. Id. at 21.
118. Id. at 22.
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taxpayer was a director.' 19 The Tax Court was convinced that the payments were not
only readily marketable but immediately convertible into cash.12 0
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was persuaded that the solvency of the
debtor, Stanolind, made collection of the future royalty a certainty.'12 Therefore, in
gauging marketability of future payments, the financial capacity of the debtor is a
major factor. Second, the contract price was unconditional and the payments assign-
able.' 22 Third, if the obligation is readily traded in commerce it is unquestionably
marketable.' 23 Finally, if the obligation is transferred at a discount not substantially
different from the market value for money at the time, then the obligation is readily
marketable and should be treated as a cash equivalent. 124
If the facts in Reed are analyzed under the Cowden factors, it appears that the
value received by Reed is not distinguishable from that received by the Cowdens. In
Reed, solvency was not at issue because the buyer did not control the proceeds.
Instead, the buyer irrevocably placed the proceeds in the escrow account, and Reed
was able to transfer the right to the future payment. No evidence was shown to
indicate whether the right could be traded commercially; nevertheless, nothing in the
escrow account prohibited an assignment. Finally, the amount placed in escrow
represented the full purchase price of the Electromech stock, and no discount rate was
applied because deferral amounted to only one week. Thus, under the Cowden
analysis, the funds in the escrow account in Reed were readily marketable and the
seller-taxpayer technically received a cash equivalent.
Therefore, the seller-taxpayer in Reed received a benefit that could be measured
in terms of its marketability. As a result, the court should have applied the economic
benefit doctrine to Reed. How instead it concluded that the escrow account was
intended as merely an added assurance that payment would be made is unclear.25
Without the added feature of a forfeiture clause, payment virtually was guaranteed.
3. Assignability as Evidence of an Economic Benefit
The court in Reed held that the taxpayer did not receive a present economic
benefit 26 and that the escrow arrangement was bona fide. t2 7 However, the Service
argued that the ability to assign the right to future payment was an illustration of the
taxpayer's economic benefit.128
119. Id.
120. Cowden v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 853, 858 (1959), rev'd, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961) (The Court of Appeals
sent the case back to the Tax Court for further findings of fact because it believed that the Tax Court overemphasized the
unwillingness of the taxpayers to accept the funds that the lessee was ready, willing, and able to pay. Cowden v.
Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 25 (5th Cir. 1961)).
121. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 148 (1st Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 146.
127. Id. at 143.
128. Id. at 148.
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In response to this argument, the court stated that all deferred payment sales
could be subject to the assignability argument. 129 At first, this statement does not
appear to be vulnerable to attack. Many deferred compensation plans, installment
sales, insurance and annuity contracts, and other arrangements represent valuable
present interests in rights to future payments. These are commonly assigned for their
discounted value. Only through "legislative grace" are most of these interests exempt
from taxation. 130 Tax liability is usually imposed unless there is an express exclusion
from gross income, regardless of the benefit's transferability. 13 1 Consequently, it
seems that the court's argument does little to refute the Service's position.
The court also responded to the Service's assignability argument by saying that
while the ability to assign was present the taxpayer did not actually assign the right.132
Viewing the transaction as a matter of equity, the court's argument is clearly accurate.
However, federal income tax is triggered upon the occurrence of a taxable event.
Because of this general policy, it makes little difference that the taxpayer did not
actually assign his right. To determine the point of realization, the question of whether
the taxpayer exercised the right is not always reached. Once the question whether the
taxpayer has received something of value has been answered in the affirmative, the
tax will apply at that moment in time.
Including a provision that makes the escrow arrangement nonassignable in-
creases the likelihood of defeating the imposition of the economic benefit theory,
since at the very least the argument that the escrow proceeds are the equivalent of cash
would be less tenable. Whether it is enough to avoid immediate tax liability has been
called "problematical."' ' 33 A threshold issue is whether a restriction on alienation
would be upheld by a court.
At common law, clauses that restrict alienation, or nonassignment clauses, are
valid in most cases. 134 However, the trend in commercial law is to reject such
restrictions as a matter of public policy. 3 5 The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
states: "[A]s accounts and other rights under contracts have become the collateral
which secures an ever increasing number of financing transactions, it has been
necessary to reshape the law so that these intangibles ... can be freely assigned." 136
Section 9-318(4) states:
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it
prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits creation of a security interest in a general
intangible for money due or to become due or requires the account debtor's consent to such
assignment or security interest. 137
129. Id.
130. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934) ("Whether and to what extent deductions shall
be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be
allowed.").
131. Brrix, supra note 10, at 105-32.
132. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 148 (lst Cir. 1983).
133. Gemmill, The "Economic Benefit" Attack on Nonqualified Plans; Cautionsfor Draftsmen, 22 J. TAx'N 79, 82
(1965).
134. Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1251, 1253-56 (1954).
135. U.C.C. § 9-318 comment 4 (1978).
136. Id.
137. U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1978).
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However, an escrow account like the one used in Reed may not be within section
9-318(4) of the U.C.C. 138 An escrow agreement is clear evidence of an underlying
contract of sale. Nevertheless, an "account" as used in section 9-318(4) is defined
as "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered ".... 139
A "general intangible" is defined as "any personal property ... other than goods,
accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and money." a40 The cash held in
escrow in Reed fits neither of these definitions. Specifically, the cash is not an
"account" because money is expressly excluded from the definition of "goods" in
section 9-105 of the U.C.C. t 4 1 Likewise, cash is not a general intangible because
"money" is expressly excluded by section 9-106.142
It may be concluded that Article Nine of the U.C.C. is not directly applicable to
a sale of a business or a sale of securities.143 Therefore, the restriction on nonas-
signment clauses found in section 9-318(4) is inapplicable to a Reed-type transac-
tion. 44 Nevertheless, the trend in the law is to reject such clauses, and the U.C.C.
may be applied by analogy as very persuasive authority.1 45 Indeed, the Tax Court has
said that transfer restrictions which are "fleeting" will not alter the tax treatment,
especially where there is no business purpose for the restriction. 146
After the threshold issue whether a court would uphold a nonassignability clause
is resolved, some conclusions may be made. If a court were to uphold the restriction
on alienation despite the application of the U.C.C. by analogy, then the Service's
argument that the seller-taxpayer's ability to assign the escrow proceeds evidences the
present beneficial interest would be more difficult to maintain. Certainly, finding a
cash equivalent would be less likely. This Comment has concluded that property
received that is not the equivalent of cash may not qualify as an economic benefit. 147
Therefore, deferral using an escrow account could succeed. If the restriction on
alienation is not upheld, then inclusion of the nonassignment clause will have little
effect on the final determination whether the taxpayer received an economic benefit.
138. Id. Moreover, Article Nine may not be applicable. U.C.C. § 9-104 (1978) exempts certain transactions from
Article Nine. Subsection () exempts the sale of accounts or chattel paper in the context of a sale of the entire business.
See, e.g., Paul v. Chromalytics Corp., 343 A.2d 622 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
139. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1978) (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. The term "goods" is defined in § 9-105(h) to include all movable things except "money, documents,
instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, or minerals ....-
142. Note that in Reed the underlying property sold, stock in John Reed's company, is a "security" under § 8-102,
which is within the definition of "instrument" in § 9-105. General intangibles expressly exempt "instruments" in §
9-106. Therefore, a security does not qualify as a general intangible for § 9-318(4) purposes. Likewise, a security does
not qualify as an account under § 9-106 because "instruments" are expressly excluded from the definition of accounts
in § 9-106.
143. See Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 Tx. L. Ray. 471, 566 (1975).
144. However, the restriction on nonassignability clauses in § 9-318(4) does apply to a sale of tangible personal
property. U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1978). Application of § 9-318(4) is apparently dependent upon the type of property held
in escrow.
145. U.C.C. § 9-318 comment 4 (1978).
146. Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933, 941 (1980).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
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IV. FUNDAMENTALS AND POLICIES OF SEcrioN 453
If a transaction qualifies as an installment sale, 48 a taxpayer may defer realiza-
tion of gain on a sale by using the installment method of reporting under section 453
of the Code. 149 The function of the installment method is to spread the gain ratably
over all taxable years in which the seller-taxpayer receives payments. 5 0 This
alleviates the bunching of the gain which could otherwise occur. 151
The general policy behind installment sale treatment is that the burden of
appreciation should not be borne by the taxpayer in a single tax year.' 52 Since the
appreciation in the value of the property sold occurs over a number of years, it is
inequitable to force inclusion of the entire gain in one year.' 53
In 1980 section 453 was revised, 54 making the installment method mandatory
for all installment sales 55 unless the taxpayer elects not to have section 453 apply.' 56
Congress also amended the two-payment rule because it felt that the rule resulted in
inequitable application.' 57 For example, under pre-1980 law, if a taxpayer sold
property in year 19X1 for $100,000 and received $1,000 as a down payment with the
balance due in one payment in 19X5 the two payment rule was satisfied.158 Therefore,
under pre-1980 law the taxpayer could take advantage of the installment sale method.
Conversely, if a taxpayer did not receive a nominal down payment, but instead
received the entire sale price in one lump sum in 19X5, the two-payment rule
prohibited use of the installment method because the sale consisted of only one
payment. Congress felt that this disparate treatment was unjustified. 159 Consequently,
it changed the rule so that the installment method could be used if a single payment
were received in a year other than the year of sale. 160
If the Service successfully invokes the constructive receipt doctrine or the
economic benefit doctrine, then "payment" is deemed to be made in the year of sale.
As a result, the taxpayer would not have a deferred sale that qualifies for the
installment method. Not only does the taxpayer lose the deferral, but the taxpayer also
loses the ability to use the installment method. The result under the two-payment rule
would be the same.
148. An "installment sale" is defined as "a disposition of property where at least 1 payment is to be received after
the close of the taxable year in which the disposition occurs." I.R.C. § 453(b)(1) (1982).
149. The "installment method" is a method of tax accounting under which the taxpayer recognizes income only for
the proportion received in that year which the gross profit bears to the total contract price. I.R.C. § 453(c) (1982).
150. S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4696, 4701.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. However, mitigating provisions already exist in the Code, and this factor militates against an expansive reading
of § 453. For example, only 40% of net long-term capital gains are taxed. I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1982). Section 1301 provides
for income averaging. I.R.C. § 1301 (1982). This provision permits the spreading out of earnings. Consequently, the Code
provides for relief from the bunching problem in other ways.
154. Installment Sales Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980).
155. I.R.C. § 453(a) (1982).
156. I.R.C. § 453(d)(1) (1982).
157. S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDs CoNG. & AD. NEws 4696, 4704.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. I.R.C. § 453(a), (b)(1) (1982).
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It seems that the amendments made in 1980 were intended by Congress to
liberalize the installment method and encourage taxpayers to use this statutory method
of deferral. One of the primary definitional changes made section 453 applicable
unless the taxpayer elects out.' 6' In addition, "payment" is defined as that which
"does not include the receipt of evidences of indebtedness of the person acquiring the
property (whether or not payment of such indebtedness is guaranteed by another
person)." 1 62 The Service treats escrow devices as full payment rather than mere
evidence of indebtedness, even though it is unclear that this was the result intended
by Congress. 163 Consequently, the seller-taxpayer must realize the entire sale pro-
ceeds in the year of sale. Since no payments are made in a year other than the year
of sale the taxpayer is prohibited from using the installment method.
It is unclear whether Congress deliberately has attempted to force taxpayers to
use the installment method rather than other methods, such as escrow devices, to defer
realization. 164 However, it seems very clear that the 1980 amendments to section 453
were intended to make section 453 more available and more equitable. Perhaps it
would be better if section 453 were the exclusive means of deferral of Reed-type
transactions. Congress has not been so specific. 165
V. CONCLUSION
From the seller's standpoint one of the major problems in arranging a commer-
cial transaction is to reduce the risk that the buyer will default. One purpose of the
Reed escrow device was to remove the risk of default by placing the funds into an
escrow account. Unfortunately, if the seller-taxpayer receives the cash in a lump sum,
there may be devastating tax implications. 66 Consequently, an incentive exists to
attempt to defer realization of the gain for federal income tax purposes while
161. I.R.C. § 453(a) (1982).
162. I.R.C. § 453(0(3) (1982).
163. Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(5)(ex 8), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 301. See Ledlie, supra note 101, at
140-42. (Ledlie argues that the use of letters of credit by Congress in S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nrws 4696, 4713, was intended to be an illustration of a "third-party guarantee" rather
than an exclusive list. Ledlie, supra note 101, at 140. The Service has, nevertheless, narrowly interpreted the definition
of "payment" to include escrow accounts and not letters of credit. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(5)(ex 8), T.D.
7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 301. Ledlie suggests that a letter of credit is a functional equivalent of an escrow account and
should not be treated differently. Ledlie, supra note 101, at 141-42.).
164. The Ninth Circuit has said that the installment method is "Congress's [sic] method of providing relief from the
rigors of [including the entire proceeds in the amount realized in] section 1001(b)." Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,
524 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1975).
165. However, Congress has said:
The creation of a statutory deferred payment option for all forms of deferred payment sales significantly expands
the availability of installment reporting to include situations where it has not previously been permitted. By
providing an expanded statutory installment reporting option, the Committee believes that in the future there
should be little incentive to devise convoluted forms of deferred payment obligations to attempt to obtain
deferred reporting.
S. Rr. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE Coro. & AD. NEws 4696, 4719.
166. If a seller-taxpayer receives a large amount of cash a large portion of that will be used to pay federal income
tax. This is because the tax rates are graduated. I.R.C. § 1 (1982). The more cash received the higher the marginal tax
rate.
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simultaneously removing the risk of default. Reed v. Commissioner 67 provides the
mechanism for achieving this result.
Taxpayers in the First Circuit are encouraged to follow Reed. However, since the
taxpayer in Reed received an economic benefit, the case is of dubious authority in
other jurisdictions. 168 Once the seller-taxpayer has secured the transaction by putting
the sale proceeds beyond the buyer's control, then, absent a forfeiture clause, the risk
of default has been entirely removed. The essence of the transaction is the same as
if an outright sale had occurred. 169 The parties have assumed the benefits and burdens
of ownership in substance if not in form. This is true regardless of the intent of the
parties. 170
By revising section 453,171 Congress has indicated an intent to encourage the use
of the installment method of reporting. Whether Congress specifically meant to
discourage the use of the escrow device is uncertain. The Service has taken the
position that escrow devices may not be used in the context of an installment sale. 172
However, until Congress expressly precludes the use of escrow arrangements to defer
realization of income, such devices probably will be used again.
Gary Friedhoff
167. 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 102-25.
169. The Reed decision makes it easier for unscrupulous taxpayers to evade federal income tax by setting up an
escrow arrangement that is actually a subterfuge. The seller-taxpayer could be compensated for the loss of interest income
by a commensurate increase in the sale price.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
171. Installment Sale Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980).
172. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(5)(ex 8), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 301.
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